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PULLING EDB-CONTAMINATED FOODS OFF SUPERMARKET SHELVES:
A COLLEGIAL APPROACH TO COMPLEX AND UNCERTAIN SCIENCE
Arthur Greenberg

Professor of Chemistry

I

n September 1983, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) initiated
a ban on EDB (ethylene dibromide), a fumigant widely used on fruit crops and stored grain,
after discovering high levels in groundwater.1 At
that time, EDB was also employed as an additive in leaded gasoline. EDB was known to cause
cancer as well as birth defects in test animals. It is
capable of chemically bonding with DNA as well
as proteins. Since EDB has two bromine atoms,
it can create DNA cross-links making mutations
particularly difficult for cellular repair. Subsequently, California officials reported alarmingly
high levels of EDB in fruits. Reports of high levels
in muffin, corn flour, and cake mixes, as well as
some imported fruits, started to appear. The EPA
adopted guidelines on February 3, 1984 restricting maximum levels in ready-to-eat foods to 30
parts per billion (ppb), 150 ppb in foods to be
cooked, and 900 ppb in raw grain.1
The present essay revisits why and how decisions
were made to remove EDB-contaminated foods
from supermarket shelves during a month-long
period of intensive concern. It is a process that
had scientific, medical, political, and financial
dimensions. Risks to public health as well as millions, possibly billions, of dollars rested on these
decisions. Typically, the average citizen only learns
of final decisions in such cases, the processes leading to them being both complex and mysterious.
In the EDB case study summarized very briefly
in this essay, the most reassuring aspects were the
“conservative” (i.e., human-protective) approach
and the collaboration between industry, government, and academe that led to action based upon
complex, albeit uncertain, science. The author
had the good fortune to be a member of the state
panel that made recommendations enacted by the
state of New Jersey.
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A Brief Primer on Human Exposure to Toxic
Substances
Carbon monoxide is a toxic substance2 that
produces acute (short-lived) effects.3 While acute
exposure to levels of 150-200 parts per million
(ppm) or higher may well result in death, exposure to levels around 70 ppm causes nausea and/or
vomiting. Fresh air restores normal health. In contrast, chronic exposure to exceedingly low levels
(ppb, ppt, or lower) of carcinogens may result in
irreversible development of cancer. What is a ppb
(part per billion)? Imagine a single drop of EDB
in a municipal swimming pool. A ppt (part per
trillion) is one thousand times even more dilute.
Although humans have DNA-repair mechanisms,
it is theorized that, in principle, cancer can be
initiated by a single mutation. This is the basis
for the USEPA classifying the MCL (Maximum
Contaminant Level) of carcinogens such as EDB
as zero. However, since chemical analysis is amazingly sensitive (not uncommonly 0.001 ppt),
the USEPA issues practical standards for MCLG
(Maximum Contaminant Level Goal). The
MCLG for EDB is 0.05 ppb in drinking water.4
Humans are exposed to toxic substances
through inhalation, ingestion, and dermal absorption. Consider the example of the carcinogen
trichloroethylene (TCE),5 an industrial degreaser
used to clean metal prior to painting. Waste TCE
may ultimately flow into sources of drinking
water. How does one assess risk? First, measurements using extremely sensitive chemical analyses
are performed to survey a representative set of
groundwater systems. Of 55 systems serving populations in the U.S. greater than 100,000 people,
it was determined that 41 had TCE levels lower
than 0.5 ppb, 14 had TCE levels in the range 0.5
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to 5 ppb, and none had levels exceeding 5 ppb.5
At the other extreme (systems serving 25 to 100
people), of 19,125 estimated systems, 18,506 were
estimated to have levels less than 0.5 ppb, 465
between 0.5 to 5 ppb, and 156 higher than 5 ppb
including 26 greater than 100 ppb.
Next one considers human exposure to highlypolluted water (100 ppb). This is a “conservative”
(i.e., worst case, human-protective) approach.
Exposure routes include ingestion of water, inhalation of indoor air as well as shower air, and dermal
absorption (bathing, swimming). Based upon
fairly rough assumptions, total daily exposures
to TCE are formula-fed 9 lb infant: 80 μg (microgram = millionth of a gram); 70-pound preteen: 320-640 μg; 132-pound woman: 600 μg;
154-pound man: 490 μg. Why the higher number
for the woman?5 When these estimates were made
(1980s), a considerably higher percentage of women compared to men, spent more time at home.
Although estimates of source concentrations and
especially human exposure scenarios have large
uncertainties, the greatest uncertainty comes from
extrapolation of animal testing to realistic human
exposure scenarios. Animal studies of carcinogens
are usually impractical using realistic exposures.
Even a very potent carcinogen may produce one
case of cancer in 1000 animals at realistic levels.
To make animal carcinogenicity testing feasible,
unrealistically high doses are administered. Extrapolation of “megadose” data to environmentally-realistic levels can easily account for an
uncertainty factor of ten thousand or more. In the
absence of more precise science, the “conservative”
(people-protective) approach is a linear extrapolation from the POD (point of departure): the
estimated dose near the lower end of the observed
range.6
		
How Were Decisions Made?
New Jersey assembled an EDB Advisory Group

consisting of 10 scientists and medical doctors
and chaired by an assistant commissioner of the
New Jersey Department of Health.7 The group
included epidemiologists, toxicologists, chemists,
biochemists, medical doctors, a medical ethicist,
and scientists from the food industry. There was
constant exchange of data and information with
the USEPA, as well as with the health departments of large states including California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas.
The goal of the Advisory Group was to make a
recommendation to the New Jersey Department
of Health about which foods must be immediately
removed from market shelves and not sold (or
donated) to the public.
The first analyses were conducted on baby foods.
Happily, the results were negative at the limits of
detection. A sample of Mexican oranges obtained
in a New York City market was the “record holder:” 41,590 ppb (peel); 2,173 ppb (pulp). A box
of long-grain rice was found to have a level of 351
ppb EDB and the batch was immediately recalled
by the manufacturer. A survey of 23 commercial
bread samples found that 20 had undetectable
levels of EDB, with an overall average of 0.88 ppb
(one sample had 7.4 ppb); seven ready-to-eat corn
muffins had an average of 3.1 ppb, and 12 cold
cereals all had levels lower than the limit of detection.
As these chemical analyses continued, the next
step was estimation of total human exposure to
EDB. To simplify the process, three classes of
people were recognized (with estimated daily consumption in parentheses): 1) General Population
(grains: 270 grams; citrus crops: 74 grams); 2)
Vegetarian Population (grains: 970 grams; citrus
crops: 200 grams); and 3) Two-Year-Old Child
(grains: 103 grams; citrus crops: 125 grams). Total
ingestion of EDB was then estimated for various
EDB concentrations from 1 ppb to 50 ppb. While
removing contaminated foods from the shelves
would effectively eliminate ingestion of EDB,
The University Dialogue t t t 2011-2012
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inhalation of EDB from ambient air was unavoidable (in 1984 EDB was still added to leaded gasoline). A survey of the literature indicated average
concentrations of EDB in ambient air of 27 ppt.
A two-year-old child inhales about 8 cubic meters
(m3) of air per day; an adult inhales about 20 m3
of air each day. The exposure comparison was very
illuminating. If the limit adopted for ready-to-eat
food was the USEPA recommended maximum at
30 ppb,1 a two-year-old child would ingest 6.9
μg of EDB per day and inhale 1.7 μg from average ambient air. If the food limit was designated
at 5 ppb, daily ingestion would account for 1.1 μg
while inhalation would still account for 1.7 μg. If
the limit for ready-to-eat food was designated at 1
ppb, daily ingestion would account for 0.2 μg and
daily inhalation would account for1.7 μg—almost
an order of magnitude greater. It must be pointed
out that in 1984 little was known about the
relative health hazards of ingested versus inhaled
EDB.
Analysis of lifetime (70-year) risks of cancer
deaths due to exposures to EDB at various levels
then followed. It is generally accepted that one in
a million “excess deaths” over a lifetime due to a
specific source is an acceptable benchmark since
that is below the “background noise” of other
lifetime risks such as automobile accidents and
various health risks. Among many scenarios, the
EDB Advisory Group made the following comparison of Excess Cancer Risk per million for the
General Population for ready-to-eat foods (citrus
and grains): At 1 ppb: Risk due to grains + citrus: 6; Risk due to air: 80. At 5 ppb: Risk due to
grains + citrus: 33; Risk due to air: 80; At 30 ppb:
Risk due to grains + citrus: 190; Risk due to air:
80. In the decision-making process, Massachusetts
considered adopting guidelines of 1 ppb for both
intermediate products (e.g., muffin mixes) as well
as ready-to-eat foods. That would have resulted
in the elimination from supermarket shelves of
roughly 11 percent of ready-to-eat foods and 87
percent of mixes. Ultimately, New Jersey settled
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on the USEPA guidelines, eliminating roughly 3
percent of ready-to-eat products and 2 percent of
intermediate products.
The Aftermath
The use of EDB as a fumigant was banned in
1984 and all traces disappeared from the food
chain during the next two to three years. (The 70year lifetime exposure scenario noted above was
also part of the human-protective decision-making
strategy.) Leaded gasoline was totally eliminated
from on-road vehicles by the USEPA as of January
1996 and EDB was no longer a gasoline additive. Its lifetime in the environment is only on
the order of months so it is no longer a problem.
Ironically, EDB’s first replacement as a fumigant,
methyl bromide (more volatile and less toxic),
was found to be damaging to the ozone layer and
banned by 2005. Fumigation remains an important technique for producing and storing food at
reasonable cost. Typically, modern fumigants such
as arsine are volatile and short-lived in the environment but their high toxicity requires great care
by those who apply them to crops or stored grains.
And what of the foods removed from supermarket shelves and the food supply during 1984?
One could readily make the case that the EDB
risks were far lower than risks due to malnutrition.
Why not supply these food products to malnourished populations? However, such a decision
would have been almost certainly impossible on
purely political grounds.
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